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INTRODUCTION 1. 
Romanian military and other 
countries’ armed forces use outdated 
air defense systems that had many 
years of service and still do not 
consider feasible to improve or 
update those systems in the next 20 
years or more. The types of technical 
challenges that system operators 
will meet during operations can be 
separated into three categories:
mobility and interoperability; • 
material damage; • 
obsolescence. • 
The components of integrated systems 
that can be subject to further improvements 
can be categorized as follows:
aerodynamic component (the  • 
missile body);
propulsion system; • 
optoelectronic systems of  • 
guidance, navigation and control.
 Missile aerodynamic structure 
is mainly composed of metals 
susceptible to wear (due to cracks, 
corrosion) and other components 
such as missile control systems 
(wing ailerons) which are based on 
honeycomb structures or carbon ﬁ  ber.
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Honeycomb structures served as 
the control surfaces of the missile, 
margins for the wings and stabilizers 
and entered into the composition of 
parts that make up the body of the 
rocket. A common arrangement for 
such structures includes a pair of 
outer plates made of a metal, such as 
aluminum or epoxy resin mixed with 
carbon  ﬁ  ber, a core of honeycomb 
structure made of aluminum or 
other materials being included glass 
ﬁ  ber and an adhesive with the help 
of which the plates are glued to the 
honeycomb core.
Figure 1.  Composite honeycomb 
structure
Adhesive joining parts damage 
can be caused by moisture penetration, 
damage caused by impacts and 
premature aging of adhesive. Kernel 
vulnerability to damage depends 
on the material from which it was 
manufactured.
Carbon ﬁ  ber structures
Carbon  ﬁ   ber structures were 
used to manufacture exterior panels 
for control surfaces and stabilizers. 
A common arrangement for such 
structures include carbon ﬁ  ber layers 
oriented so as to match with the main 
directions in which tasks are acting on 
the missile body. Before placement, 
carbon  ﬁ   bers are combined with 
certain chemicals such as epoxy 
resin. After all the ﬁ  bers are placed in 
position, the ensemble is placed in an 
autoclave where a program pressure 
and temperature causes the chemical 
interaction to form a strengthened 
structure with a system of ﬁ  bers 
which are embedded. The role of the 
ﬁ  bers is to distribute uniformly the 
forces acting on missile components 
(wings). The resin is used to prevent 
the collapse of the ﬁ  bers. Structural 
damages can result from various 
problems, including manufacturing 
imperfections that expand when the 
missile performs various maneuvers 
or when moisture penetrates inside the 
structure which leads to exfoliation 
of the carbon ﬁ  ber.
The evaluation of the assurance 
level to achieve a satisfactory return 
on a long-term investment in the 
purchase of new engines face a 
number of challenges which become 
increasingly severe with increasing 
time of using missiles.
Ancillary systems and board equipment
This category includes all 
components except the missile 
aerodynamic structure and propulsion 
system (engine and its accessories). 
Cables, hydraulic systems, pneumatic 
systems, fuel pumps, valves, 
electronic components, charge of 
explosives, missile components 
that communicate with ground 
control equipment and ﬂ  ight control 
elements, all these equipment are 
included in board equipment and 
ancillary systems of missiles.
Any of these components present 
a high risk of vulnerability to wear caused by material aging leading 
to a number of problems such as 
increasing maintenance costs, low 
availability of spare parts and failure 
of safety devices when handling the 
missiles at ground. A unique system, 
unlike missile aerodynamic body, is 
unlikely to cause early exit of the 
resource. However, these types of 
problems can be solved without much 
difﬁ  culty unlike aerodynamic problems 
and propulsion. Of course, is required 
to consider that reliability, availability, 
cost and safety can become an issue if 
the missiles are too old.
Material damage
Materials from which are 
built ancillary systems and board 
equipment may be damaged in so 
many different ways than fatigue 
and corrosion. Some systems such 
as hydraulic and pneumatic systems 
may present leaks which may cause 
a change in the ﬂ   ight path of the 
missile. Fault caused by worn wires 
or damage of electronic components 
can also cause the missile explosion 
before reaching the target or make it 
no longer manage to initiate explosion 
charge near the target.
THE METAL STRUCTURE  2. 
OF THE MISSILE SYSTEM
The main technical challenge regarding 
the wear of the missiles includes:
small cracks caused by  • 
material fatigue;
multiple cracks caused by  • 
material fatigue;
various forms of corrosion. • 
Ironically, the success obtained 
in terms of solving small cracks 
occurrence (through careful selection 
of materials during design, through 
regular inspection and replacement 
of material presenting problems) 
open the way for more complex 
vulnerabilities. The success obtained 
in managing and preventing small 
cracks gave us the possibility of 
maintaining missiles in service for 
such a long period of time so they 
become vulnerable to multiple cracks 
spread on a speciﬁ  c portion or the 
entire surface of the missile. Damages 
caused by material fatigue represent 
a problem much more serious and 
harder to solve than damages caused 
by simple cracks.
2.1. Simple cracks caused by 
material fatigue
Simple cracks are the main 
factor in missile frazzle. These 
cracks can only occur if a part of 
the missile was exposed to cyclic 
stress, including stretching efforts. 
Crack initiation, their stable and 
subsequent propagation is governed 
by the intensity of the stress level of 
the material and initially appears as a 
ﬂ  aw in the material, which then leads 
to the crack. Material stress intensity 
is determined by four factors:
the size of the crack; • 
peak magnitude of the voltage  • 
near the crack for reverse cycle;
minimum stress for that cycle; • 
details regarding the geometry  • 
of the affected area near the crack.
Figure 2. Simple crackRegarding this aspect there are 
some questions such as:
Where could cracks appear, how  1. 
quickly can they increase and 
when should inspectors begin 
their search in the material 
structure?
If they could develop undetected  2. 
and lead to structural failure that 
would cause structural collapse 
of missile, will that part which 
caused the destruction ever be 
found?
How will inspectors know what  3. 
to look for in the analysis to 
discover the malfunction which 
caused the failure?
These are the kind of problems 
facing air defense missile systems 
due to the use of outdated missiles 
and due to the extension of their 
resources way after their end of life 
cycle (because of ﬁ  nancial reasons).
2.2. Multiple cracks caused by 
material fatigue
Another issue is the high 
concentration of simple cracks on 
a signiﬁ   cant surface of missiles 
structure. Such concentration may 
appear in several places on one 
surface of the structure, such as 
a missile wing or might occur on 
multiple missile components (major 
damage). Regarding this aspect the 
questions that arise are mostly the 
same as in case of simple cracks. The 
understanding of this type of wear 
was made possible due to the study of 
fracture mechanics and through the 
management of aircraft components 
fatigue in general.
Figure 3. Multiple cracks due to 
material stress
Aviation community interest 
has been directed toward this type 
of problem only after the collapse 
of Aloha 737 ﬂ  ight in April 1988. 
However after 20 years the experts 
are still searching solutions for 
preventing the appearance of cracks 
in aerodynamic structure of aircrafts 
and missiles.
The crash of Aloha ﬂ  ight  737 
showed how simple cracks join 
to form a large crack that leads to 
the failure of a large area of wings 
aerodynamic structure. Detection 
of this type of failures before 
determining the crack of o important 
missile parts is a major problem 
in the aviation industry because of 
inspection methods limitations. Even 
we know what missiles and which 
missiles parts must be inspected, the 
problem still remains due to the great 
variety of missiles and their large 
numbers. For all these reasons, the 
development rhythm of methods to 
provide protection against both simple 
and multiple ﬁ  ssures was slowed down 
both in aviation and air defense.
2.3. Damages caused 
by generalized fatigue
While fatigue cracks reach a 
signiﬁ   cant size in several areas 
of the structure, the maintenance and modiﬁ   cation costs increase 
inevitably. Because their impact on 
the economy is major:
the economic viability of  • 
continuing operations decreased 
(under limited resources conditions), or
the risk of failure increases -  • 
because is required to execute a large 
set of inspections using available 
resources, without allocating 
additional resources.
The existence of a signiﬁ  cant 
number of cracks requires an 
increasing number of inspections (or 
changes) at some levels that may be 
considered unacceptable, this level 
of the wear could be referred as 
generalized or fatigue damage. This 
type of wear may be the result of 
multiple cracks that have developed 
in different parts of the structure. 
The dismantlement of an aerospace 
system (missile, airplane) depends 
on the material and the geometrical 
characteristics, and also on operating 
conditions. Figure 3 presents a 
summary of the main causes and 
forms of deterioration which leads to 
the appearance of wear particles.
Figure 4. Causes which lead at the appearance of wear particles
2.4. Cracks caused by corrosion
The class of issues caused by 
corrosion of the material can take a 
variety of forms. A common cause 
attributed to this type of problems 
includes the presence of both the 
corrosion process and the stress level 
applied on the material perpendicular 
to the direction of the greatest strength 
of the material. This type of stress 
that applies transverse across the 
resistance structure can be developed 
in the ways described below.
Exposure of the ﬁ  bers 1.   – 
Cracks caused by corrosion can grow 
on a part of the material (at the edge) 
where the longitudinal ﬁ  ber of the 
material (parallel to the direction of the  ﬁ  bers which assure the highest 
resistance) is exposed to the action 
of corrosive agents. Those agents 
are acting as a feather (used to split 
wood) spacing the parallel ﬁ  bers of 
the material on a transverse direction. 
Such behaviour is a consequence 
of the fact that corrosion products 
require a greater volume of material 
than the one which is consumed 
during the corrosion process.
Residual stress 2.   – Also known 
as internal stress, may occur when 
the material is laminated, extruded or 
forged in order to obtain different parts 
of the missile (fuselage, wings, ailerons, 
resistance structures). The corrosion that 
occurs in an area affected by residual 
stress may lead to the formation of 
cracks caused by corrosion.
The stress that occurs during  3. 
the manufacturing process - When 
the parts of the rocket are assembled 
to form the ﬁ  nal  product,  ﬁ  tting 
them together can create transverse 
tensions or the phenomenon of stress 
due to merge. Again, if an area that 
presents such a phenomenon is 
subject to corrosion rises the risk of 
corrosive cracks appearance.
Certain alloys of aluminum, some 
thermal treatments and some methods 
for materials processing were found 
as causing this type of damages.
2.5. Corrosions made through 
exfoliation
This type of corrosion is 
characterized by the formation of 
small bumps  which appear on the 
surface of the affected material 
or by peeling it similarly to wood 
which has been attacked by bugs. In 
general, this type of corrosion does 
not include a stress mechanism.
It has been discovered that thick 
panels that form the upper surface 
of the missile body are vulnerable to 
corrosion made through exfoliation, 
beside the ﬁ   xing holes where the 
aerodynamic body panels are attached 
to the missiles interior skeleton. The 
rockets are much more vulnerable to 
corrosion when exposed to moisture. 
One of the factors that lead to this 
type of wear is represented by peeling 
off the layer of cadmium from the 
joining bolts; this prevents the contact 
between steel and aluminum. This 
coverage is very important because 
steel and aluminum are very different 
in terms of electric potential.
Missiles are very vulnerable to 
atmospheric factors such as moisture. 
Pickling the paint and the base layer 
of material (in order to restore the 
barrier against the moisture) had the 
unintended effect of removing the 
layer of cadmium from the surface of 
the connecting bolts.  
Figure 5.  Corrosion around the joint pins
Because of this some panels need 
to be replaced and as the storage life 
of missiles in service increases, this 
would lead to higher costs in comparison 
to costs involved in modernizing certain 
types of missiles or the purchase of new 
types of air defense systems.2.6. Corrosion due to cracks
The corrosion caused by the 
cracks may develop at the interface 
between two adjacent parts if every part 
is prone to corrosion and moisture makes 
contact with the surface of each side.
The application of one or more 
barriers against the moisture may also 
protect the material against corrosion 
caused by cracks, as follows:
a coating applied in the area  • 
where the missiles body components 
are combined, to prevent moisture 
and to provide a conductive path of 
electricity between the parts in contact;
apply a coat of primer and  • 
topcoat paint before joining the parts 
and after they were merged to prevent 
moisture to penetrate into areas where 
the parties are merged and applying a 
protective layer against corrosion.
However as time passes, the 
ability of paint to provide a barrier 
against the ingress of moisture can 
degrade.
MATHEMATICAL  3. 
MODELING OF RELIABILITY 
GROWTH WITH A 
PONDERAL INFLUENCE OF 
THE ELEMENTS WHICH 
ARE PREDISPOSED AT 
DEFORMITY
Let us consider a new element 
(one aileron, from maximum 4), in a 
proper functional way at a moment
0 = t . The deformity is produced at 
the moment t.
As deﬁ  ned, the reliability of the 
aileron at moment t, is given by the 
following formula of probability:
                                                 
) ( ) ( t T P t R > =                     (1)
                                                              
Applying this relationship is made 
by using the concepts for estimates, 
samples and probability laws for 
a period of life T. Considering a 
number  0 n  - element in a proper 
functional way at the moment  0 = t .
Figure 6.  Variation of products number 
in a proper functional way
Observation:
a) The number of falls during Δt; 
b) Decrease in time of elements 
number in a proper functional way.
At  t  moment there are still n 
elements in a proper functional way. 
During  ) , ( t t t Δ + , n Δ  elements fails. 
So n is the number of elements in 
a proper functional way before the 
) , ( t t t Δ +
  range. The relation 
between  n Δ  and  t Δ   is realized 
considering that  n Δ  is proportional 
with  t Δ :
                          (2)                                        t n t n Δ − = Δ ) ( l
    
Where: λ is a factor of proportionality, 
(λ>0), and the minus sign takes 
account that n  decreases when t 
increases.
Considering as a theoretical model, 
for continuous and differentiable 
function, which has the limit:
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we reach at the ﬁ  rst order differential 
equation which can be also named 
„the differential equation of falls”:
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                                                      (4)This differential equation is the 
underlying for deﬁ  ning the relations 
of the fundamental identities of 
aileron reliability.
Specifying relation (3) in relation 
to n, obtain:
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Considering following limit 
conditions:
t = 0, n = n0;
t = t, n = n;
by integrating the relation (4)  it becomes:
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t
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Proportionality factor λ is named 
“the rate (instantaneous) of failure”. 
These can be considered constant, 
λ=λ0=const. or variable λ=λ(t).
The fraction 
0 n
n  represents the 
proportion of elements in a proper 
functional way or the frequency of 
the elements in a proper functional 
way at t moment.
Aileron’s reliability during operability
In case we are interested on 
reliability only during a speciﬁ  c 
range (t0, t1), reliability is named „ 
mission’s reliability” and it can be 
determined as follows:
Figure 7.  Variation of reliability:
a) reliability with λ variable; 
b) reliability with λ constant
Considering the events:
A – Optimal operation during (0, t0);
B – Operation during (t0, t1);
C = A∪B – good operation during 
(0, t1).
The probability of these events 
represents the following reliabilities:
               
                                                      (7)
B event is conditioned by the 
fulﬁ   llment of A event. The 
conditioned probability of B event 
represents the mission’s reliability, R 
(t1/t0) or conditioned probability:
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In the particular case, 
λ=λ0=const.
                                 t l l 0 0 1 0 ) (
0 1 ) / (
− − − = = e e t t R
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where θ=t1-t0 represents the mission’s 
time.
It is noticed that in all cases where 
λ=λ0=const. The reliability depends 
only on θ range indifferent where it 
is that speciﬁ  c range on time scale.  
So the element with λ=const. is 
the element “without memory” or 
without wear. The reliability on a 
speciﬁ   c range does not depend on 
the time of previous operation or 
the probability of  operation without 
failure on a speciﬁ  c  (t0, t1) does 
not depend of how much did this 
functioned before. Concluding, it 
does not depend on time, it depends 
on range.
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−INSTITUTIONAL  4. 
CHALLENGES FOR 
OPERATORS OF INTEGRATED 
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS
Romania and other operators 
of outdated air defense systems 
can expect to encounter difﬁ  cult 
institutional challenges. Air defense 
systems are outdated and become 
older. What is their real functionality? 
How much attention they need to keep 
maintenance costs as low as required? 
The main institutional challenge for 
such questions includes limitations 
on independent veriﬁ  cation  of 
operating status of missiles and 
limiting conditions for engineering 
analysis including risk assessments 
and also a decreased global resource that 
should be considered before making an 
investment no matter how insigniﬁ  cant 
in outdated air defense systems.
Independent veriﬁ  cation  of 
integrated air defense systems status 
and forecast of future conditions
Although objective assessment of 
the current and future conditions are 
fundamental to effective management 
of the life cycle of resources, only few 
operators seem to have the resources 
necessary for technical expertise. 
Thus, of necessity, most operators of 
integrated air defense systems depend 
largely of spares manufacturers and 
their suppliers.
Limitations regarding the 
information needed for material analysis
Achieving effective management 
of the lifecycle of the missile 
systems requires detailed analysis 
of the current status of the resource, 
forecasts of future conditions of 
integrated air defense systems and 
those options that could better 
correct  any errors of evaluation, in 
order to reduce uncertainty and for 
mitigate some risks. Such analysis 
requires both objectivity and access 
to the information that can be used to 
analytical methods.
Structural fatigue
For this problem, achieving an 
efﬁ   cient life-cycle for integrated 
air defense systems requires the 
following information: early detection 
of cracks caused by material fatigue, 
monitoring the severity of cracks of 
each air defense system, inspections 
planning and maintenance work to 
extend their life depending on the 
severity of wear and the decision 
to make a compromise between the 
remaining life of the system and the 
costs to eliminate the damage caused 
by material fatigue. Any delay 
in providing accurate and timely 
information on material fatigue 
help reduce life cycle of integrated 
air defense systems. For example, 
failure to detect an early stage of 
crack caused by material fatigue 
could cause more expensive repair or 
worse can reach a stage where there 
can be nothing to do, missile cannot 
be longer used. On the other hand, 
an inspection earlier than needed is a 
waste of economic resources.
CONCLUSIONS  5. 
As the cost of sustaining aging 
integrated systems continues to rise, 
and as the competition for scarce 
resources continues, getting each  
S.A.M.’s sustainment road map right 
will become increasingly important 
to controlling sustainment costs 
and protecting the operator from 
disruptions  caused by unanticipated 
sustainment problems.The new approach addresses the 
technical and institutional challenges 
of aging and the associated issues 
related to managing resources by 
using a total-systems paradigm 
that breaks a resource-management 
system into its principal domains 
to analyze how major challenges 
and issues relate to values that are 
important within each domain and to 
the customer. Connections to such a 
value structure can help the decision 
of makers set policy priorities for 
enhancing the resource-management 
system that must deal with the further 
aging of already-old Air Defense 
aerospace vectors.
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